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4. I do not attempt to deal with recommendation that His Majesty's Govern- ment should take action at Moscow to secure removal of Russian Bolsheviks from Canton, or suggestion that other maritime Powers might be induced to co-operate in warlike action against Canton, as these matters appear to lie outside my province.
(Repeated to Hong Kong and Canton.)
(D.)
Sir R. Macleay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received January 30.)
(No. 40.) "Telegraphic.)
Peking, January 30, 1926.
YOUR telegram No. 30 and ny telegram No. 39. From official reports of His Majesty's consul-general at Canton and His Majesty's consuls at Swatow and Amoy, which are confirmed by private letter from Governor of Hong Kong, reports of abortive negotiations between representatives of colony and Canton Government for a settlement of strike and boycott, I think it is unquestionable that both Canton Government and local authorities in other cities in province of Kwangtung are still under direct Bolshevik influence, and that this influence, which is open and violently anti-British, stands in the way of a settlement.
I broached the question of possible intervention as mediators of moderate Kuo Min Tang element to Minister for Foreign Affairs on 27th January. He replied that Peking Government had attempted to send two delegates to Canton, but circumstances had prevented their going farther than Shanghai. He undertook to go into the whole question of situation in the South and difficulties between Hong Kong and Canton with Premier, with special reference to proposal to send delegates to the South to enquire not only into external but also internal situation and attitude of Cantonese towards Peking Government. I derived the impression that neither present Government in Peking nor moderate element in Kuo Min Tang had any influence whatever with faction now predominant in Kwangtung.
From further conversation I elicited that Wang considered that Shameen incident, which bad caused great loss of life on Chinese side, including a number of schoolgirls, was chiefly responsible for revolutionary feeling, and he did not disguise the fact that his sympathies over this incident were with Canton, and, according to reports received from His Majesty's consul at Swatow, out-stations of local native customs (which are in the nature of li-kin barriers administered under 1901 protocol by Maritime Customs), had been seized by local Reds. Inspector- general informs me that this was done without authority of Canton Government, and head office of native customs at Swatow has not been interfered with.
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as none of my colleagues here would take responsibility for expressing any definite 532 opinion or of putting concrete proposals up to their Governments.
I cannot tell what real grievances of Cantonese are, but it would certainly appear from reports recently about negotiations and from declarations of C. C. Wu and Sun Yat-sen's son and from general attitude of dominant Red faction that they are inspired with intense animosity against Great Britain and hope to use alleged economic grievances of strikers to force Hong Kong Government to deal direct with latter and to extract impossible and humiliating political concessions. So long as this faction, openly directed and abetted by Bolsheviks, remains predominant, I fear that all attempts at conciliation will be useless, and that neither offer of control of local customs revenues, which incidentally we have no right or power to make alone, nor generous allocation of Boxer indemnity funds for education or public utility schemes would have any effect. There are, however, signs of internal dissensions, and it is evident throughout whole of China, with the exception of Kuangtung, that Bolshevik prestige and influence have been severely shaken even in the eyes of Nationalist and student elements by high-handed action of Soviet Government in threatening to use force in connection with recent dispute on Chinese Eastern Railway and by failure of extremists to avail themselves of opportunity afforded by Chang's temporary eclipse] to set up a Communist Government in Peking
I therefore adhere to view expressed in my telegram No. 39 that, while con- tinuing local efforts to arrive at a settlement should emergence of a moderate party in Canton make this possible, we should await development of growing anti-Bolshevik feeling and formation of a coalition of friendly military leaders, who will probably, if and when they find themselves strong enough to do so, take action against Canton.
If you wish to justify this policy of apparent inaction before Parliament. I venture to suggest you might explain His Majesty's Government's policy as having been governed by principles of friendliness towards Chinese people and sympathy with their legitimate aspirations, as that outlined in your speech of 18th September and in instructions to British delegates at Tariff Conference. This policy of patient conciliation has borne abundant fruit in restoration to a great extent of friendship and goodwill between British and Chinese peoples and resumption of normal com- mercial relations throughout China except in a few areas, such as, notably, province of Kuangtung, which are controlled by external influences violently and openly hostile to Great Britain.
You will doubtless consider desirability of indicating whether our patience in dealing with these unreasonable and irreconcilable elements may not in the end become exhausted, and whether His Majesty's Government may not be forced reluctantly into a change of policy against them.
(E.)
(F.)
Sir It. Macleay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.-(Received February 1.)
(No. 42.) (Telegraphic.)
CANTON telegram No. 10. Your telegram No. 35.
Peking, February 1, 1926.
I think that I have shown in my telegram No. 39 grave dangers and objections to resorting to force at the present moment in the manner contemplated in paragraphs 1 and 2 (b) of your telegram.
Whether or not strike boycott and refusal to trade can be held to be infringement of Washington or any other treaty, I much donbt whether other Powers not directly affected would agree that we would be justified in regarding this high-handed and unfriendly treatment of colonies and of our trade by Canton as a casus belli.
Even if boycott of Japan mentioned by His Majesty's consul-general at Canton in his telegram No. 3 were to materialise. I doubt whether Japanese Government, judging by their supine attitude towards previous boycotts, would be willing to join us in use of force. France alone, who has nothing to lose, would probably be most ready to co-operate. In any case, should it be considered desirable to ascertain views of Powers either as to our acting alone or as to their willingness to take international action, the enquiries must be made in London or in respective capitals,
Consul-General Jamieson to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received February 2.) (No. 5) (Telegraphic.)
Canton (vid Hong Kong), February 2, 1926. AS it is impossible in the given time to secure tripartite consultation by direction of His Majesty's Minister, I submit following comments on your telegram No. 35 to Peking:
1. As war would leave a legacy of hatred and might unite rest of China, I deprecate it emphatically.
2. Joint international action appears to me the sole solution. Independent action as indicated would be internationally impossible.
By rendering it impossible for us to trade, and arresting British subjects, Cantonese have completely broken the letter and the spirit of treaties, and Detention of Russian action under article 7 would certainly seem called for. steamships would be easy, but they do not carry essential commodities, such as coal and rice.
3. I consider non-intervention should be adhered to, as present Government is the best Kuangtung has ever had, and introduction of others would lead to chaos. Chiang may before long, of his own volition, quarrel with Bolsheviks.
4. I can offer no opinion.
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